International Workshop
Proyecto PAPIIT –II401508
“Epistemología y Valoración”
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
UNAM
México City
8-9 October 2009
Proyecto PAPIIT –II401508
“Epistemología y Valoración”
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
UNAM
México City
8-9 October 2009
Venue: Salón Fernando Salmerón, IIFs
Invited Speakers
Ralph Wedgwood
(University of Oxford)
Nishi Shah
(Amherst College)
Fernando Broncano
(Universidad Carlos III, Madrid)
Speakers and Commentators
Jason D’Cruz
(SUNY Albany)
Miguel Angel Fernández
(UNAM)
Claudia L. García
(UNAM)
Allan Hazlett
(Fordham University)
Benajmin McMyler
(Texas A&M University)
Veli Mitova
(UNAM)
Mark Nelson
(Westmont College)
Jill Rusin
(Wilfrid Laurier University)
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
(Aarhus University)
Margarita M. Valdés
(UNAM)
Jesús Vega
(Universidad Autónoma, Madrid)
Call for Papers
In recent years epistemologists have become increasingly interested in the normative aspects of belief and in whether the normativity of belief should be understood as strongly analogous to the normativity of action; to that extent the notion of epistemic agency has become a locus of philosophical debate. Some of the questions that inform this debate are:
• Is the concept of belief constitutively normative?
• Are epistemic reasons/ 'oughts' intrinsically motivating?
• What is the source of the normative force of epistemic reasons/norms?
• Can we have pragmatic reasons for believing a proposition, as opposed to pragmatic reasons for causing ourselves to form certain beliefs?
• Is belief voluntary?
• Is doxastic deliberation possible?
• Is it appropriate to think of epistemic appraisal as appraisal of agents?
• Do we have any special responsibilities qua epistemic agents?
• Is epistemic appraisal of agents best understood along virtue-theoretic lines?
• Are believing and knowing related to subjects in the same way as is acting?
Organisers: The Epistemology and Value Research Group (PAPIIT - IN401508), Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas.
Official language: English
Fees: The workshop is free of charge. Coffee and lunches will be provided for delegates on 8 and 9 October.
• Is the concept of belief constitutively normative?
• Are epistemic reasons/ 'oughts' intrinsically motivating?
• What is the source of the normative force of epistemic reasons/norms?
• Can we have pragmatic reasons for believing a proposition, as opposed to pragmatic reasons for causing ourselves to form certain beliefs?
• Is belief voluntary?
• Is doxastic deliberation possible?
• Is it appropriate to think of epistemic appraisal as appraisal of agents?
• Do we have any special responsibilities qua epistemic agents?
• Is epistemic appraisal of agents best understood along virtue-theoretic lines?
• Are believing and knowing related to subjects in the same way as is acting?
Organisers: The Epistemology and Value Research Group (PAPIIT - IN401508), Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas.
Official language: English
Fees: The workshop is free of charge. Coffee and lunches will be provided for delegates on 8 and 9 October.
