

# **“Daring to Believe”: Epistemic Agency and Reflective Knowledge in Virtue Epistemology**

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## **Abstract**

We shall examine the concept of reflective knowledge in Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology. On the one hand, it is a kind of metacompetence. From this view, it could be considered as a mere cognitive device. But, on the other hand, it represents a higher stage on the process of knowledge. What sort of level is one in which reflective knowledge reaches epistemic significance? We will argue that Virtue Epistemology confronts an “Integration Problem” for epistemic agents, and that reflective knowledge must be located, to solve it, at a personal level. By considering a psychological mechanism as metacognition as an empirical instance of the integration issue, we will reflect about what means to be an epistemic agent and what it has to do with the Integration Problem.