

Denying Doxastic Reasons

Nishi Shah

Amherst College

Abstract

In this paper I defend evidentialism against an error-theorist about doxastic reasons. The error-theorist rejects evidentialism not because he thinks there are pragmatic reasons for belief, but because he thinks that there are no reasons for belief at all. He claims that our practice of reason-attributions is defective in the same way that the practice of witch-attributions is defective. Just as no persons have the property of being a witch, so there are no facts or states of affairs that have the property of being a reason for belief. Any judgment that attributes to something the property of being a reason for belief is, therefore, false. I argue that my previous argument for evidentialism can be used to refute this type of error-theorist about doxastic reasons. I conclude by discussing whether my refutation of the error-theorist is an illegitimate form of transcendental argument.